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VALUATION DISPUTES IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 
KENNETH AYOTTE† & EDWARD R. MORRISON†† 
Prior scholarship points to valuation disputes and valuation error as key drivers of 
Chapter 11 outcomes. Avoiding valuation disputes and errors is also the underlying 
driver of most proposed reforms, from Baird’s auctions to Bebchuk’s options. In this 
paper, we undertake a detailed examination of bankruptcy court opinions involving 
valuation disputes. Our paper has two goals. The first is to understand how parties 
and their expert witnesses justify their opposing views to judges, and how judges 
decide between them. The second is to provide practical guidance to judges in 
resolving valuation disputes. We document surprisingly pervasive (and often self-
serving) errors in expert testimony. This is particularly true when valuation experts 
apply the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. With respect to key elements of that 
method, such as the discount rate, we observe stark inconsistency between expert 
testimony and finance theory and evidence. We propose simple strategies based in 
finance theory that judges can employ (such as avoiding the use of company-specific 
risk premia in discount rates) to reduce the scope for valuation disagreements in 
Chapter 11. We also recommend that judges rely on the peer-reviewed finance and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Valuation disputes lie at the heart of the Chapter 11 reorganization 
process.1 The premise of reorganization is that the firm may be worth more 
as a going-concern than liquidated. Markets may be sufficiently illiquid that 
this going-concern value cannot be realized through a sale of the entire firm. 
 
1 Of course, valuation disputes loom large in many areas of law. One example is appraisal 
litigation in corporate law. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Appraising the ‘Merger Price’ 
Appraisal Rule, 35 J. L. ECON & ORG. (forthcoming 2019) (laying out an optimal valuation measure 
for fair value in the mergers and acquisitions law context). The valuation controversies discussed in 
this paper are not unique to corporate reorganization, but we are unaware of literature—in 
bankruptcy or other areas—that studies the methods used by valuation experts and how courts react 
to them. 
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To avoid the illiquidity problem, the law allows a plan proponent to avoid a 
sale and instead distribute new claims (new debt and new equity) on the 
reorganized company to its old investors according to their entitlements. 
Those entitlements hinge upon the value of the company. Junior creditors, 
for example, are entitled to new claims only if there is sufficient value to pay 
more senior creditors in full. Deciding what the company is worth is the job 
of the bankruptcy judge. In doing that job, the judge is placed in the difficult 
position of having to reach a valuation determination in the presence of 
competing arguments from expert witnesses. In theory, parties can settle their 
disputes in the shadow of a judicial valuation, but they often do not. The 
testimony required to resolve these disputes can delay resolution of a case by 
months, and costs imposed on the estate can be substantial. Experts typically 
base their valuation testimony on complicated techniques that require 
substantial discretion to implement. Evaluating the validity of the 
assumptions used in valuation modeling requires an understanding of finance 
theory, statistical methods, and industry-specific and company-specific 
conditions. 
The academic literature on bankruptcy has long been aware of the judicial 
valuation problem generally, as early work by Blum illustrates.2 More 
recently, Baird3, Bebchuk4, Adler5 and other scholars6 have proposed various 
mechanisms that avoid judicial valuations entirely. Whatever the merits of 
these proposals, they do not reflect existing law. Since judicial valuation is 
unlikely to disappear from bankruptcy any time soon, we should understand 
more about how parties explain their opposing valuation positions to a judge, 
and how judges decide these disputes. 
To do this, we study reported cases involving a Chapter 11 valuation 
dispute. Our sample begins in 1990 and includes 143 cases. Each case was 
coded by two research assistants and read by one of us. The most common 
settings in which these disputes appear are plan confirmation hearings and 
fraudulent transfer litigation, but they also arise in adequate protection 
 
2 See Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 
572 (1950) (“[Judicial value] can never be objectively ascertained or verified but always remains in 
the realm of opinion or belief.”). 
3 See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 
145 (1986) (advocating mandatory auctions). 
4 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
775, 777 (1988) (proposing an options-based reorganization mechanism). 
5 See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 311, 312 (1993) (proposing a “Chameleon Equity” mechanism). 
6 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in 
Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L. J. 83, 86 (2001) (proposing a junior dilution mechanism); Anthony J. Casey 
& Edward R. Morrison, Beyond Options, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY HANDBOOK (Barry E. 
Adler ed., forthcoming 2019) (on file with author) (proposing an “automatic” bankruptcy procedure 
that largely eliminates judicial valuation). 
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hearings, preference actions, motions to value secured claims, and other 
contexts. 
Attempts at manipulating valuations to serve the self-interest of the 
litigants is common. In some cases, the judge catches it. But in many cases, 
experts on both sides use assumptions that have no reliable basis in finance 
theory or evidence. The most prominent of these is the use of “company-
specific” or “unsystematic” premiums when calculating the discount rate for 
future cash flows. These are nothing more than arbitrary add-ons that drive 
the company’s reported value downward. We find cases in which experts 
recommend, and judges approve, company-specific risk premia as large as 
10%. Although prominent practitioner publications admit the absence of 
reliable evidence for these add-ons, they recommend them anyway.7 Absent 
training in financial theory, it would be difficult for a judge to “smoke out” 
this kind of valuation manipulation. It is especially difficult when both sides 
employ similar manipulations, but in opposite directions. 
More broadly, based on our reading of the opinions in our sample, we 
believe that the discounted cash flow (DCF) method is particularly 
susceptible to the kinds of manipulation that are difficult for non-experts to 
evaluate. Because DCF leans heavily on subjective assumptions that are 
difficult to test, if not entirely untestable, we believe this method is not well-
suited for adversarial litigation in a bankruptcy case. It may be best used as a 
last resort when more transparent approaches (surrounding market evidence, 
comparable transactions, or comparable company multiples) are unreliable, 
and only when discount rates can be calculated using well-grounded 
approaches that have a basis in finance theory and evidence. Thus, we find 
opinions such as Iridium8 and Boston Generating,9 which place greater weight 
on contemporaneous evidence of offers (or lack of offers) by market 
 
7 As Shannon Pratt explained: 
[T]he unsystematic risk specific to the subject business or business interest, still 
remains largely a matter of the analyst’s judgment, without a commonly accepted set 
of empirical support evidence. The analyst will base this judgment on factors . . . such 
as financial statement and comparative ratio analysis and the qualitative matters to be 
considered during the site visit and management interviews. However, after carefully 
analyzing these elements of investment-specific risk, there is no accepted model for 
quantifying their exact effect on the discount rate. The analyst must depend on 
experience and judgment in this final element of the discount rate development, but 
should explicitly describe the factors that affect this final element. 
SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD 
COMPANIES 185 (5th ed. 2008). 
8  Statutory Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Motorola, Inc. (In re Iridium Operating LLC)], 
373 B.R. 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
9 In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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participants, more convincing than post-hoc valuation estimates by self-
interested litigants. 
When DCF is used, assumptions used to calculate the discount rate 
should be justified using theory and evidence from the peer-reviewed finance 
literature, rather than valuation industry journals and guides. Assessing 
appropriate risk factors, such as whether a risk premium is warranted for 
small firms, is a complicated judgment that requires finance theory and 
sophisticated statistical techniques. Because finance scholars have spent 
decades engaged in this debate, support from the peer-reviewed finance 
literature should be a necessary condition for admissibility of any method 
used to calculate a discount rate. 
The judges in our sample of cases are adept in screening out manipulative 
assumptions when they evaluate multiples-based valuations. In those cases, 
disputes between experts take many forms: which income statement variable 
should be used to generate the multiple? Should the multiple be trailing or 
forward? Is the comparison group, which was chosen to generate the multiple, 
actually comparable? Expertise in finance theory is less essential to evaluate 
competing arguments about these inputs, so judges and adversarial litigants 
do a better job screening out assumptions that are intended to manipulate the 
valuation estimate. 
Although we are critical of many practices in our sample, we believe 
expert witnesses can and should continue to serve an important role in 
valuation disputes. Experts are necessary for understanding the subject 
company’s unique circumstances, making inherently difficult judgments 
about discount rates and comparable companies, and conveying technical 
information effectively to non-expert judges. We believe this process will be 
more informative to judges if experts are required to make decisions based on 
a more confined and standardized toolkit than the wide-open space that 
currently exists. Shrinking the space of available arguments also has the 
potential to reduce disagreement between the parties as to how a court will 
value the asset in question.10 Reducing this disagreement should promote 
settlement, increase speed, and reduce litigation costs that deplete the 
bankruptcy estate. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, we give a brief overview of 
valuation techniques, our classification scheme, and our hypotheses. Part II 
introduces the data and our findings. Part III provides some practical 
takeaways that judges can use to spot manipulation and separate the good 
arguments from the bad. 
 
10 See Kenneth Ayotte, Disagreement and Capital Structure Complexity 1 (Mar. 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (showing how disagreements about collateral values 
can cause costly valuation litigation and inefficient liquidations). 
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I. VALUATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 
A. The Law of Valuation 
Key moments in a Chapter 11 reorganization hinge on valuation. The 
judge must value an asset or the entire firm when a creditor seeks 
compensation for depreciation in the value of collateral (“adequate 
protection”); when the judge determines the amount each creditor is owed, 
and whether the debt is secured or unsecured (“claims allowance”); when the 
debtor attempts to recover assets that were transferred improperly to 
creditors or others prior to the bankruptcy case (“preferential transfer” and 
“fraudulent conveyance” actions); and when the debtor proposes a plan of 
reorganization that is opposed by some stakeholders (“cramdown”). 
Sometimes the valuation is straightforward. During claims allowance, for 
example, the judge determines whether debt owed to a secured creditor 
exceeds the value of the underlying collateral. The creditor has a secured 
claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured (deficiency) claim to 
the extent that the debt exceeds the collateral’s value, which “shall be 
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed 
disposition or use of such property.”11 This means, according to the Supreme 
Court, that we use “foreclosure value” if the debtor plans to sell or abandon 
the property, but use “replacement value” if the debtor plans to keep it.12 
Replacement value is “the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset 
for the same ‘proposed . . . use.’”13 Neither “foreclosure value” nor 
“replacement value” are typically difficult to measure in practice. 
Most of the time, however, the standards for valuation are vague and 
unhelpful. When a proposed plan of reorganization is disputed, the judge 
must determine (i) the firm’s value and (ii) whether the plan distributes value 
in accordance with bankruptcy priorities, such as the “absolute priority rule.” 
The Code says a lot about (ii), but almost nothing about (i). 
The same legal vacuum can be felt in fraudulent conveyance actions. In 
the typical case, the debtor’s estate can claw back assets transferred 
prepetition to other parties if it can prove that (i) it received less than 
“reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the assets (ii) at a time when 
the firm was insolvent or had “unreasonably small capital.”14 None of this is 
straightforward. A transfer is made for “reasonably equivalent value” if the 
 
11 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012). 
12 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997). 
13 Id. 
14 11 USC § 548(a)(1) (B) (2012). 
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“totality of the circumstances”15 show that the debtor received “approximately 
equivalent” value,16 or that the estate was not “unfairly diminished,”17 or that 
the debtor’s “realizable going concern value after the transaction is equal to 
or exceeds its going concern value before the transaction.”18 The standards for 
assessing whether a debtor was insolvent or had unreasonably small capital 
are just as vague. A debtor is insolvent under the Code if “the sum of [its] 
debts is greater than all of [its] property, at a fair valuation.”19 It has 
“unreasonably small capital” if it has “such meager assets that bankruptcy is a 
consequence both likely and foreseeable.”20 
B. Valuation in Practice 
Valuation standards may be vague, but the tools of valuation are well-
established. Though there are many names and variants, methods for valuing 
a company as a going-concern are typically classified into three groups:21 
discounted cash flow (DCF), comparable company multiples (CCM), and 
comparable transaction multiples (TM).22 A fourth method that is often used 
in bankruptcy cases is what we will call direct market evidence, such as a stock 
price, or an offer to buy securities or assets on a given date.23 Finally, if 
liquidation is being considered, book value or some other estimate of 
liquidation value may be used. 
Here we provide a brief overview of these methods, with an emphasis on 
DCF, since we are most critical of valuation practice with respect to this 
method. 
 
15 Mellon Bank v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re R.M.L., Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 
148-49 (3d Cir. 1996). 
16 BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 538 n.4 (1994). 
17 HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 635 (2d Cir. 1995). 
18 Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991). 
19 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (A). 
20 Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 794 (7th Cir. 2009). 
21 See generally Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation Methodologies: A Judge’s View, 20 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
22 See PRATT supra note 7, at 358. Many valuation methods go by different names but are 
effectively one of these three methods, or a hybrid of several of these. For example, in real estate 
valuations, methods go by names like income capitalization or yield capitalization. The essence of these 
methods involves calculating a normalized measure of income (from projecting and discounting 
future cash flows, as in DCF, or from a historical number on the income statement, as in the CCM 
or TM methods) and scaling them up by a capitalization rate (which can come from comparable 
transactions as in the TM method, or from adding a risk premium to a risk-free rate, as in the DCF 
method). 
23 See generally Michael W. Schwartz & David C. Bryan, Campbell, Iridium, and the Future of 
Valuation Litigation, 67 BUS. LAW. 939 (2012). 
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1. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
DCF begins with estimates of future cash flows and then discounts those 
flows to present value using a discount rate, thereby obtaining an estimate of 
an asset’s value. The discount rate attempts to measure the opportunity cost of 
the capital from the point of view of the investor: that is, it measures the rate 
of return that an investor could expect to get elsewhere on investments with 
risk comparable to that of the asset being valued.24 
The DCF method is correct in theory but challenging to implement in 
practice, because it requires a multitude of assumptions that are difficult to 
evaluate. Projecting future cash flows for an operating company may require 
detailed projections about future sales growth, future profit margins, capital 
expenditures, and working capital needs. These projections are contestable, 
but historical data can provide an adequate starting point for evaluating 
whether future projections are aggressive or conservative. For example, if a 
company has historically sold its products at gross margins of 30%, a model 
that forecasts future gross margins of 40% would require an explanation from 
the expert for why future circumstances are expected to change. 
A particularly controversial and influential term in a DCF valuation is the 
discount rate.25 When a business enterprise is being valued, a common 
method used to calculate the appropriate discount rate is the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) method.26 This method determines the firm’s 
overall discount rate (often called its “cost of capital”) by separately 
calculating the rates of return required by the firm’s creditors and its 
shareholders, respectively, and weighting these rates of return by the 
 
24 JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 141 (1st ed. 2007). 
25 See Stan Bernstein et al., Squaring Bankruptcy Valuation Practice with Daubert Demands, 16 
ABI L. REV. 161, 190 (2008) (“Often the key determinant and cause of variance among experts in 
their valuation opinions is the selection of the appropriate discount rate.”). 
The discount rate should not be confused with the interest rate (or “coupon rate”). The discount 
rate measures the rate of return investors would receive from a comparably risky investment. The 
interest rate (on debt) is a contractual term and may be higher or lower than the discount rate. If 
there is a risk of default, for example, the interest rate may be much higher than the discount rate. 
This is because the interest rate determines the cash flows paid to lenders when the firm does not 
default. Those cash flows must be high in order to offset the low (or no) cash flows paid to lenders 
in the event of default. The discount rate, by contrast, asks the following question: When we 
compute the cash flows that investors expect to receive on average, are those cash flows sufficient to 
offer a rate of return comparable to what the investors would receive from similarly risky 
investments? As we explain below, the “risk” that is relevant here is not the firm’s own risk of default. 
It is instead the risk that the firm’s cash flows are correlated with economy-wide factors (“market 
risk”) that investors cannot avoid by holding a diversified portfolio of securities. 
26 BERK & DEMARZO, supra note 24, at 577. 
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percentage of the firm’s financing that the creditors and the shareholders 
provide.27 
Computing a WACC requires calculating capital structure weights, an 
after-tax cost of debt, and a cost of equity. Under some conditions, the cost 
of debt can be reasonably approximated by the yield to maturity that investors 
require on the company’s bond debt. This makes life easy, because the yield 
is readily observable. The cost of equity is much more contestable. Unlike 
debt, an equity investment does not promise a particular rate of return in 
advance. A theory of future expected returns on the stock, given its risk, must 
be applied. 
Among academic finance scholars, two approaches to calculating the 
required return on equity are most common and widely advocated: the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) and the Fama–French three-factor model.28 The 
more popular of the two is the CAPM. This approach follows from a 
theoretical model and predicts that a stock’s required risk premium is based 
only on its “beta,” which measures the stock’s exposure to overall market risk 
(the “market factor”). Beta is the relevant measure of risk because, in the 
CAPM theory, investors find it optimal to hold diversified market portfolios. 
As such, investors evaluate any individual stock based on the risk it would 
add to their diversified portfolios. Whereas the CAPM is based in theory, the 
Fama–French three-factor model is based on patterns observed in historical 
data. It is one of many empirically based “factor methods” and calculates a 
stock’s expected returns based on the stock’s exposure to size and book-to-
market factors, in addition to the market factor used in the CAPM. Fama and 
French, and many other scholars, have argued that these three factors (size, 
book-to-market, and the market factor) are good predictors of the rate of 
return that equity investors demand for holding a particular stock.29 
Each method has its strengths and weaknesses, and scholars disagree 
about which is preferable. The virtue of the CAPM is that it is a well-
articulated theory. It begins from assumptions about investor behavior and 
uses them to derive clear predictions about future expected rates of return. 
Empirically, though, tests of the CAPM provide only limited support for the 
theory. Although there is a historical relationship between betas and stock 
 
27 The formula for the WACC is E/(D+E)*re+D/(D+E)*(1-t)*rd, where E is the market value 
of the firm’s equity, D is the market value of the firm’s debt, t is the corporate tax rate, and re and rd 
are the investors’ required rates of return on the company’s equity and debt, respectively. Id. at 577. 
28 See generally Ivo Welch, The Consensus Estimate for The Equity Premium by Academic Financial 
Economists in December 2007 (July 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084918. 
29 See generally Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing 
Anomalies, 51 J. FIN. 55 (1996). 
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returns, other factors besides beta have been found to predict excess returns, 
which runs contrary to the theory.30 
The Fama–French method and related models provide convincing 
evidence that historical rates of return have depended on the stock’s exposure 
to size and book-to-market factors in addition to the market factor. But this 
approach lacks convincing theoretical foundations. It is unclear, for example, 
exactly why an investor should require higher returns for holding a stock of a 
company simply because the company is smaller, or because it has a higher 
book-to-market ratio.31 As such, it is unclear whether the historical correlation 
between these factors and stock returns is sufficient to conclude that these 
factors are truly risk factors that investors require compensation for bearing. 
For example, the historical correlation might just be the product of “data 
snooping bias”: a researcher with enough data and time can always find some 
variables that are spuriously correlated with stock returns.32 Consistent with 
this explanation, empirical evidence suggests that the small-firm premium 
may have disappeared following its discovery.33 
We find a very different approach to discount rates when we turn to 
valuation industry publications and expert reports. A common approach there 
is to use what is called the “build-up method.”34 This method starts with a 
risk-free rate and adds a risk premium, as in the CAPM. But, unlike the 
CAPM, the build-up method gives the valuation analyst discretion to make 
further adjustments based on factors other than market risk, including firm 
size, industry, and company-specific risks.35 The magnitude of the risk premia 
for size and industry are drawn from industry publications that lie outside 
the peer-reviewed academic finance literature.36 The company-specific 
premium is left to the discretion of the analyst, based on her subjective 
perception of the company’s general riskiness according to a multitude of 
factors.37 
 
30 BERK & DEMARZO, supra note 24, at XX. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 404. 
33 See generally Mathijs A. van Dijk, Is Size Dead? A Review of the Size Effect in Equity Returns, 
35 J. BANKING & FIN. 3263 (2011). 
34 See PRATT, supra note 7, at 198-200 (explaining that the “build-up model divides the risk 
premium into its three main subcomponents and estimates the cost of capital as the sum of the . . . 
risk-free rate” and “risk premium, including one or all of the following subcomponents,” “[a]n equity 
risk premium . . . [a] size premium . . .” and “[a] company-specific risk premium”). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 196 (citing Duff & Phelps Risk Premium Report for statistical evidence regarding the 
size premium), 201 (citing Ibbotson Associates SBBI Valuation Edition 2002 Yearbook for evidence 
regarding the industry risk premium). 
37 See PRATT, supra note 7, at 202-03 (listing twenty-nine factors that the analyst may consider 
to determine the company-specific risk premium, including demographics, employee stability, 
internal and external culture, economic factors, IT systems, and location). 
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The justification given for using the build-up approach and company-
specific risks, instead of the CAPM, is that the assumptions underlying the 
CAPM do not hold in the real world, particularly for small owner-managed 
companies whose owners are necessarily undiversified and thus exposed to 
company-specific risks. Though this argument has intuitive appeal, the build-
up model does not present any viable alternative theory that can be used to 
determine how undiversified an owner must be before a premium might be 
warranted, and what the magnitude of this premium should be, if it exists at 
all. 
Empirical finance research provides evidence against the existence of 
company-specific risk premia in the real world. Research reveals that public 
company stocks with greater nonsystematic risk do not earn higher returns 
after adjusting for systematic risk.38 To the contrary, it appears that stocks 
with greater idiosyncratic risk actually produce lower returns.39 Moreover, 
even for small private companies where lack of diversification is a valid 
concern, evidence suggests that returns to the owners of small private 
companies are no larger than returns generated by their public-company 
counterparts.40 
As a result, the standard CAPM model, despite its recognized flaws, 
remains the dominant method taught in MBA classrooms.41 Moreover, survey 
evidence suggests that the CAPM is the dominant method used by 
investment banking advisors who advise companies on mergers and 
acquisitions42 and by chief financial officers (CFOs) to evaluate their own 
firms’ cost of capital.43 CFOs of small firms do not report using higher costs 
of capital than large firms, so size premia are not commonly used in finance 
practice either.44 The build-up method is popular, it seems, only among 
people working in the valuation industry. 
 
38 See Andrew Ang et al., The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected Returns, 61 J. FIN. 259, 261 
(2006) (finding “stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have low average returns,” contrary to 
predictions from some behavioral models). 
39 Id. 
40 See Tobias J. Moskowitz & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Returns to Entrepreneurial 
Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 745, 745 (2002) (“Private equity 
returns are on average no higher than the market return on all publicly traded equity.”). 
41 See Welch, supra note 28, at 3 (reporting that 75% of finance professors recommend using 
CAPM for corporate capital budgeting purposes, while 10% recommend the Fama-French model). 
42 Robert F. Bruner et al., Best Practices in Estimating the Cost of Capital: Survey and Synthesis 8 
FIN. PRAC. & EDUC. 13, 17 (1998) (reporting that 80% of advisers surveyed use CAPM to calculate 
the cost of equity). 
43 See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 201 (2001) (finding that 73.5% of respondents in a 
survey of CFOs always or almost always use the CAPM). 
44 See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Equity Risk Premium in 2015 8, (Dec. 4, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2611793) (finding no “size 
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2. Comparable Company Multiples (CCM) and  
Comparable Transaction Multiples (TM) 
The CCM and TM methods start by identifying a group of comparable 
companies (or projects) that have assets, operating risks, and growth 
opportunities comparable to those of the target company. The next step is to 
compute the enterprise value (or other value measure of interest) of these 
comparable companies. In the CCM method, enterprise value is measured 
using the market values of comparable publicly traded companies. In the TM 
method, value is measured using the observed prices paid in acquisitions of 
comparable companies. In both methods, the enterprise value of each 
comparable company is divided by an easily calculable measure of the 
company’s scale or profitability, such as revenues or EBITDA. The ratio of 
enterprise value to company scale (or profitability) is called a multiple. This 
multiple is then applied to the target company’s data to find the target’s 
estimated enterprise value.45 
Although CCM and TM are generally easier to understand and apply 
than DCF, these methods also rest on assumptions about the expected cash 
flows from operations, leverage, and cost of capital of both the target and the 
comparable companies. These assumptions are made explicitly in the DCF 
method but made implicitly through the choice of comparable companies in 
the CCM and TM methods.46 Disputes over the validity of a CCM or TM 
estimate will typically concern the comparability of the comparison group 
used to generate the multiples. Experts also disagree about the appropriate 
denominator in the multiple. For instance, they might debate whether a 
multiple of sales or EBITDA should be used to estimate enterprise value or 
whether the data from the comparables should be trailing (historical) values 
or forward (estimated future) values.47 Finally, some experts advocate ex-post 
 
effect in our survey: the average WACC for firms with less than $25 million in revenue is 10.6% and 
the WACC for the largest firms with annual revenue greater than $10 billion is 10.5%”). 
45 See BERK & DEMARZO, supra note 24, at 261. 
46 As a court explained in Peltz v. Hatten: 
Simply put, when it comes to valuation issues, reasonable minds can and often do 
disagree. This is because the output of financial valuation models are driven by their 
inputs, many of which are subjective in nature. The DCF method involves projections 
of future cash flows (which are largely dependent on judgments and assumptions about 
a company’s growth rate) and judgments about liquidity and the cost of capital. 
Similarly, the comparable sales method involves making subjective judgments as to 
what transactions are ‘comparable’ to the property being valued. 
279 B.R. 710, 737-38 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (citation omitted). 
47 See, e.g., Jing Liu et al., Equity Valuation Using Multiples, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 135, 136 (2002) 
(documenting the “extent to which different value drivers serve as a summary statistic for the stream 
of expected [profits]”). 
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adjustments to correct for differences between the target company and the 
comparables, or to adjust for the value of control.48 
Given the layering of assumption upon assumption in these methods, it 
is probably unsurprising that valuation via these methods becomes a battle of 
the experts, as we document next. 
II. DATA 
Our goal is to describe the types of arguments that experts make and how 
judges respond. We therefore focus on published opinions reported in 
Westlaw from 1990 to the present. We searched for any case that mentions 
“Chapter 11,” “valuation,” and at least one recognized technique used in 
company valuation settings, including “discounted cash flow,” “comparables,” 
“multiples,” and variants of these terms. This search yielded 226 cases, as 
Table 1 shows, but only 143 of them provided sufficient detail about the 
valuation dispute and methodologies employed.49 These 143 “relevant 
observations” are the focus of the rest of our paper. Most were decided in the 
jurisdictions most commonly chosen for corporate bankruptcy filings—the 
District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York.50 Figure 1 plots 
the distribution of cases by year, showing peaks after the 1990 recession and 
2008 financial crisis.51 
One research assistant coded the cases, and a second verified the work of 
the first. We then read all the cases ourselves to identify qualitative patterns. 
Table 2 sets out the legal issues raised in these valuation cases. Because we 
are dealing with a small sample, we show both the percentage of cases raising 
each issue (column 1) as well as the number of cases in each category (column 
2).52 The number of cases in column 2 exceeds the total number of relevant 
cases (143) because some cases raise more than one legal issue. Table 2 shows 
that a third of the cases arise from valuation disputes in the context of plan 
confirmation. The rest are split between litigation seeking the return of 
preferential and fraudulent transfers, motions filed by secured creditors to 
protect collateral, and “other” disputes, which include valuation of claims 
(claims allowance), case dismissal (solvent firms often have their cases 
dismissed), and sale or auctions of assets (363 sales). 
 
48 See, e.g., Glob. Technovations, Inc. v. Onkyo U.S.A. Corp. (In re Glob. Technovations, Inc.), 
431 Bankr. 739, 768 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010) (noting that an expert applied an ex-post multiple to 
calculate an enterprise’s value). 
49 See infra Table 1. 
50 The third-ranked jurisdiction is the Northern District of Illinois, which had thirteen 
relevant observations. 
51 See infra Figure 1. 
52 See infra Table 2. 
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III. FINDINGS: PATTERNS IN VALUATION DISPUTES 
We can now examine the data in more detail to understand how valuation 
disputes vary across different types of cases and across the different valuation 
methods advocated by the experts. Because our sample size is small, our 
inferences will necessarily be tentative. 
Valuation disputes are very different in preferential or fraudulent transfer 
cases (“ClawBack”) than in other kinds of valuation cases (“Other”). The key 
valuation issue in ClawBack cases is whether the firm was insolvent when it 
made prepetition asset transfers. Because the defendants’ experts will argue 
for positive equity valuations (solvency), while the plaintiff ’s will argue for 
negative (insolvency), we see huge variation in asset valuations. This trend is 
documented in Figure 2,53 which computes the percentage difference between 
the high and low valuations in each case. The percentage is relative to the 
high valuation. Thus, if the difference is 20%, the low valuation is equal to 
20% of the high, and if the difference is 80%, the low is 80% of the high. 
Although this approach to computing the percentage difference is somewhat 
unusual, we use it here because a number of our low valuations are equal to 
zero, making it impossible to compute the percent by which the high exceeds 
the low. 
Table 3 identifies the valuation methodologies used in our cases.54 We split 
the sample two ways. First, we separate cases in which the experts used DCF 
(Panel 1) from those where they used CCM or TM multiples (Panel 2) 
because the inputs are very different for these valuation methods and we want 
to see whether experts are more likely to disagree with respect to some inputs 
than others. We also distinguish between Clawback and Other Cases. In 
Clawback Cases, the parties are debating today whether the firm was 
insolvent in the past. Often, the court must decide whether the firm was 
insolvent two, three, or more years before it actually filed for bankruptcy. 
Problems of hindsight bias loom large here and, for that reason, we expect 
substantial disagreement among experts. In Other Cases, the valuation is 
forward looking and the goal is to identify a particular dollar value (the 
present value of future cash flows from the firm). For each legal issue, we 
report the total number of cases raising that issue (e.g., we have 141 cases in 
total and thirty-three Clawback Cases). For each valuation method, we report 
the number of cases using that method (e.g., among the 141 cases in total, 122 
use DCF). Within each valuation method, we report the percent and number 
of cases in which a particular input was disputed (e.g., WACC was disputed 
 
53 See infra Figure 2. 
54 See infra Table 3. 
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in fifty-six cases, which represent 46% of the 122 cases in which DCF was 
used by the experts). 
Focusing first on the entire sample (Column 1), the first notable pattern 
is the high level of disagreement in cases where experts propose valuations 
based on DCF. In 46% of all cases, the experts fight over the discount rate 
(WACC) and in 74% they dispute the projected cash flows. Although we see 
comparable disagreement over key inputs to CCM and TM valuations, 
especially over the choice of comparables, the overall rate of disagreement is 
somewhat higher when experts use DCF: At least one input is disputed in 
84% of cases in which DCF is used; in cases involving comparables, at least 
one input is disputed 76% of the time. 
Recall that we split our sample between Clawback and Other Cases 
because the potential for disagreement seems much larger for the former 
cases, due in part to the risk of hindsight bias. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 
3 tend to confirm this hypothesis: disputes over most inputs are more 
common in Clawback Cases. The increase is particularly striking when 
experts use CCM and TM: at least one input is disputed in 95% of Clawback 
Cases, but only 71% of Other Cases, when experts apply these methodologies. 
Figure 2 presents additional evidence that the range of disagreement 
among experts varies by legal dispute and valuation methodology. As 
discussed above, we are plotting the distribution of disagreement by 
computing the percentage by which the low valuation differs from the high. 
Thus, the higher the percentage, the greater the disagreement. Figure 2 shows 
that Clawback Cases (almost all of which are Fraudulent Transfer cases) 
generate more extreme disagreement than Other Cases. While disagreement 
in Clawback Cases ranges from 20% to 100%, it ranges from 0% to 100% in 
Other Cases. More importantly, the distribution of disagreement in 
Clawback Cases has substantially more mass over the range from 60% to 
100%, indicating that cases with such high levels of disagreement account for 
a larger share of Clawback than Other Cases. 
Finally, Table 4 presents evidence that disagreement among experts 
extends beyond inputs to the valuation methods. Experts commonly report 
valuations based on multiple methods.55 Sometimes experts will propose a 
final valuation equal to a weighted average of the valuations based on the 
multiple methods. Our data give us information about thirty-two experts who 
proposed such a weighted average. Twenty-four of these experts (75%) 
 
55 See, e.g., Kerry O’Rourke, Note, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 423-24 (2005) (“[V]aluation is an inexact science . . . The underlying 
assumptions will inevitably vary from one valuation attempt to another based on the judgment, 
experience, situation-specific knowledge, and expectations of the individual performing the 
valuation.”); see also infra notes 88–90. 
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advocated a weighted average that placed greater weight on some valuations 
(e.g., the DCF-based valuation) than others (e.g., the multiples-based 
valuations). For half of these experts (twelve), the court tells us which 
valuations received the most weight. Table 4 shows that seven of the twelve 
put greatest weight on the valuation most favorable to the client who hired 
the expert. Although our sample is very small, it provides suggestive evidence 
that there is a tendency among experts to weight their testimony in favor of 
their clients. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The foregoing statistics, combined with our own reading of the cases, 
suggest the following inferences. 
A. Experts and Courts Routinely Incorporate Firm-Specific Risk  
Premia in Discount Rates in Order 
to Adjust for Biases in Cash Flow Projections. 
Firm-specific risk is diversifiable. Systematic risk is not. As long as 
investors can diversify at low cost, discount rates do not depend on firm-
specific risk. This is fundamental corporate finance theory, and recent 
evidence confirms that firm-specific risk is not relevant to valuation.56 Yet 
experts adjust discount rates (both upwards57 and downwards58) to account 
for firm-specific risks.59 Courts often approve these adjustments even when 
an expert opposes them.60 These adjustments might be justified on grounds 
 
56 See R. Brian Calvert & David C. Smith, Company-Specific Risk Premiums: Update on the 
Scholarly Evidence 3 (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791213 (finding 
“company-specific risk does not explain variation in cross-sectional stock returns and that holders of 
risky securities do not appear to receive compensation for bearing company-specific risk.”). 
57 See, e.g., In re Pine Tree Mall Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 2010 WL 844592, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 10, 2010) (approving expert’s calculations that increased the capitalization rate to account for 
firm-specific risk). 
58 See, e.g., In re 203 N. LaSalle Street, 190 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“The bank’s 
appraiser took the point of view, in light of the high quality of the building (and perhaps the 
conservative estimation of cash flows), that the rates should be at the lower end of the spectrum.”). 
59 See In re Whitney Lane Holdings, 2009 WL 2045700, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009) 
(“Ryan applied the discount rate of 10.50%, which was consistent with [data in a publication], due 
to the location of the property, the nature of the local economy, the age and condition of the property, 
and the occupancy and rent levels.”); In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, 360 B.R. 787, 861 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2007) (noting that the parties’ experts disagreed “on the percentage of the company specific 
risk premium used in reaching the WACC”). 
60 See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int’l, 118 B.R. 282, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (concluding that the 
expert erred when using “a discount rate for present value of only 13.4%” because the expert “did 
not fully consider the possibility that the debtor would fail to meet its forecasts. Further, they made 
no provision for the market attaching a speculative quality to the debtor’s ability to achieve its 
projections.”). 
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that shareholders cannot diversify (as in a small owner-managed company), 
but experts rarely, if ever, explore whether these grounds exist for the 
company in question.  
The classic example of a firm-specific risk, often used by corporate finance 
instructors, is the risk that a regulator will not approve a new product. 
Although academic literature teaches that this risk is generally irrelevant in 
calculating a discount rate, it is cited by experts as a reason to adjust discount 
rates upward.61 Another classic example is risk of default, but that too has 
been used as a reason to adjust the discount rate.62 Because these premia are 
purely subjective, courts are forced to decide on the appropriate magnitude 
based on intuition, by relying on burden-of-proof rules, or by picking a value 
in between the experts’ recommendations.63 
There are, to be sure, exceptions to the rule. Some experts are careful to 
exclude firm-specific risk when they calculate a discount rate. When courts 
follow these experts, they generally do not do so based on a conclusion that  
firm-specific adjustments are inappropriate. Rather, courts follow these 
experts when they believe the experts are the most credible based on their 
 
61 A decision from the District of Delaware illustrates: 
We agree with the conclusion of PJSC that the discount rate for Zenith is more 
appropriately 25% than 17%. Zenith, although an established company in the consumer 
electronics industry, has clearly not been a leader in recent years. It is no Microsoft 
and no source of capital would view it as such. In fact, its inability to raise capital, at 
any rate, is one of the reasons it is in chapter 11 today. Further, the technology being 
assessed is new and untried in the market. There are significant risks inherent in its 
future: the risk that the FCC may change its decision on the standard for terrestrial 
broadcast, the risk that consumers may not embrace the new technology, the certainty 
that revenues will not be significant until digital is being broadcast and the products 
incorporating that technology are readily available and cheaper. We conclude that 
PJSC properly assessed the risk inherent in this technology by comparing it to hedge 
funds and biotech companies. 
In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 104 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (internal citations omitted). 
62 See, e.g., Adelphia Recovery Tr. v. FPL Grp. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 512 B.R. 
447, 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (reporting the expert “applied a discount rate of 15.08%, which he 
estimated to be Adelphia’s WACC. To arrive at that WACC, [the expert] assumed that ‘both lenders 
and shareholders require a higher rate of return on their investment in a fraud-plagued company 
than in a company that is law abiding.’ [The expert] quantified the risk premium he thought investors 
would apply by consulting industry reports and academic research regarding the increased cost of 
capital for firms that had lower credit ratings or that had experienced fraud.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
63 See, e.g., CNB Int’l, Inc. v. Kelleher (In re CNB Int’l), 393 B.R. 306, 321-22 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ expert has suggested an additional risk premium of 5 percent. This, 
however, would represent more than one-third of the entire discount rate that the defendant’s expert 
has proposed. . . . [T]he court believes instead that the unsystematic risk factor should fall within a 
range of 3 to 4 percent.”) 
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experience, credentials, and adherence to industry norms,64 or where cross-
examination revealed lack of foundation for the firm-specific discount rates.65 
Indeed, courts seem to prefer firm-specific adjustments, which function 
as a way to counteract cash flow projections that are overly optimistic. In one 
case, for example, the court explicitly permitted an upward adjustment to the 
discount rate, in addition to a downward adjustment in cash flows, in order 
to account for firm-specific risks in the cash flows.66  
As intuitive as this adjustment may seem, it is not only inconsistent with 
the peer-reviewed literature, but can have enormous effects on firm value, 
especially for firms that are expected to grow in the future. To take a simple 
example, suppose a company’s cash flow is expected to grow at 5% per year 
and the discount rate is 10%. Raising the discount rate by adding a company-
specific premium of just 1% (from 10% to 11%) reduces the company’s 
projected value by 16.7%. A 5% premium (from 10% to 15%) reduces the 
company’s value by 50%, and a 10% premium (from 10% to 20%) reduces the 
company’s value by 66.7%67. 
B. Courts Disagree on the Reliability of DCF, but Seem Reluctant to 
Consider Techniques that Are Used Infrequently in the Courtroom. 
When evaluating competing expert witnesses, courts reach varying 
decisions about the methods they consider more and less reliable. Many 
courts express frustration with the DCF method due to the various subjective 
assumptions that are required and the potential to manipulate the end 
 
64 See, e.g., Am. Classic Voyages Co v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Am. Classic Voyages), 367 
B.R. 500, 514 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“While each expert presents valid arguments, I am persuaded, 
in part, by Calvert’s extensive experience in performing valuations, and whose methods more closely 
followed generally accepted procedures.”); id. at 514 n.20 (explaining that an expert was persuasive 
because he “explained why he used a small cap premium in his cost of equity analysis instead of the 
Ibbotson Size Premium; why using an un-systematic risk premium in the discount rate was 
inappropriate and why he disagreed with using weekly observed beta because it introduced statistical 
‘noise’ into the calculation”) (internal citations omitted). 
65 For an example of a court’s reliance on trial testimony in its choice to use one expert’s 
proposed risk premium over the other’s, see Bank of Am. v. Veluchamy (In re Veluchamy), 524 B.R. 
277, 314 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (“At trial, [the expert] admitted that he was aware of no source that 
provides any method for determining a company-specific risk premium.”). 
66 See, e.g., In re Cellular Info. Sys., 171 B.R. 926, 935 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Accounting for 
risk in more than one element of a financial valuation model . . . is not improper per se. If 
circumstances warrant, the risk component in a valuation analysis may be allocated between the cash 
flow projections and discount rate.”); see also In re CNB Int’l, 393 B.R. at 320 (“Theoretically, in a 
discounted cash flow analysis, the appraiser should balance the reasonableness of his projections with 
an appropriate consideration of risk.”). 
67 These numbers are calculated by applying the formula for valuing a perpetuity with a 
constant growth rate: a stream of cash flows with a first-period value of C that grows at a constant 
rate g with per-period discount rate r is worth C/(r-g). 
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result.68 Indeed, a number of courts favor comparables (such as CC and TM) 
because DCF involves “far more numerous and complex assumptions,” and, 
therefore, “has greater potential for error.”69 Some courts seem unsure how 
to evaluate conflicting expert testimony on the inputs to DCF, such as the 
discount rate.70 Yet, other courts consider DCF to be the most reliable 
method for assessing value. Indeed, one court found the absence of a DCF 
valuation sufficient grounds for barring expert witness testimony.71 
Although courts have divergent views on the reliability of DCF, they tend 
to reject techniques that might improve the DCF analysis. As discussed 
above, the Fama–French model for determining the cost of equity is one of 
the two commonly used approaches (along with the CAPM) for determining 
a discount rate.72 A substantial number of scholars believe that the model is 
superior to the CAPM.73 Nevertheless, one court rejected it because it is not 
used by “valuation firms.”74 
Here is another example: DCF analysis can be applied to total cash flows 
or just to cash flows that remain after servicing debt. The latter is often known 
as “levered DCF” and, at least in 2006, it has been called “one of Wall Street’s 
most popular valuation models.”75 As popular as it is, however, levered DCF 
seems rarely used in bankruptcy cases. This is probably because the method 
 
68 See, e.g., Bachrach Clothing Inc. v. Bachrach (In re Bachrach Clothing Inc.), 480 B.R. 820, 
866 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]he disparity in [the parties’] valuations is striking given that they 
relied on the same data as their starting point. It lends credibility to the concept that the DCF 
method is subject to manipulation and should be validated by other approaches.”). 
69 Canpartners Realty Holding Co. v. Vallambrosa Holdings, LLC (In re Vallambrosa 
Holdings), 411 B.R. 899, 908 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009); see also In re Genco Shipping & Trading, 513 
B.R. 233, 254 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Although DCF is a traditional methodology used in valuation 
exercises, courts have recognized its limitations, particularly when the assumptions are unreliable or 
difficult to ascertain.”). As Judge Gerber observed: “DCF works best (and, arguably, only) when a 
company has accurate projections of future cash flows.” In re Adelphia Commc’n Corp., 512 B.R. at 
471. 
70 See, e.g., In re Glob. Technovation, 431 B.R. at 767 (“And while each side’s expert explained at 
some length how he calculated the WACC that he used, and criticized the other’s calculated WACC 
the Court concludes that neither expert’s explanation and support for his chosen WACC was 
persuasive.”) (internal citations omitted). 
71 See Chartwell Litig. Tr. v. Addus Healthcare (In re Med Diversified), 334 B.R. 89, 99 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“For essentially the same reason, [an expert’s] failure to use the DCF method 
amounts to a material flaw in his methodology sufficient to bar his testimony as an expert witness 
because his conclusions lack ‘good grounds.’”) (quoting Amorgianos v. National R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir.2002)). 
72 See supra Part II. 
73 See supra note 29. 
74 See, e.g., ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 361 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2008) (“By [the expert’s] own admission, the Fama–French method is used primarily by academics 
and was not used by the valuation industry at the time of the transfer. Even today, Fama–French has 
not gained wide-spread acceptance by valuation firms.”) (emphasis added). 
75 SCOTT HOOVER, STOCK VALUATION: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO WALL STREET’S MOST 
POPULAR VALUATION MODELS 332 (2006). 
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is used to value equity, which typically has little or no value in a 
reorganization. There are situations, however, where the method could be 
used in bankruptcy. For example, when a court confirms a plan of 
reorganization, it must determine whether the plan is “feasible” in the sense 
that the reorganized firm will be able to service its debts in the future. For 
that inquiry, it can be important to know the expected value of the 
reorganized firm’s equity. A levered DCF approach could be used to address 
this question. One court, however, rejected a version of the method because 
it 
is not a method that has been tested or relied upon by other experts, it had 
never been subjected to peer review or discussed in any publication, the 
potential rate of error is unknown, and there is no evidence that this method 
was ever employed, discussed, and certainly not generally accepted in any 
academic or professional community.76 
Thus, courts disagree about the reliability of DCF and, at the same time, 
resist variations on the method. This may reflect an aversion to uncertainty. 
The complexity and subjectivity of the DCF method render it an opaque 
approach that any non-expert would have difficulty evaluating. That difficulty 
seems to lead at least some judges to prefer the valuation method that yields 
the lowest disagreement among experts, even if that method is potentially 
less accurate. Thus, if two experts present DCF-based valuations that diverge 
substantially, but comparables-based valuations that are much closer, a court 
may ignore the DCF.77 
C. Courts Are Aware that Many Experts Design Their Testimony to Provide 
Maximal Support for Their Client. 
Some, But Not All, Courts Catch These Attempts. 
It’s not uncommon for a court to find that an expert chose a particular, 
unsuitable comparable “as his only comparable in order to reach a desirable 
valuation,”78 or for a court to be “left with the distinct impression that [the 
 
76 In re Young Broad., Inc., 430 B.R. 99, 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). Other commentators have 
also noted the reluctance of courts to consider variations on the DCF method. See, e.g., Duston K. 
McFaul & Kirk S. Cheney, Are A Debtor's Trading Prices Reliable Evidence of Its Enterprise Value?, Am. 
Bankr. Inst. J., September 2011, at 56 (“Courts may be reluctant to embrace any methodology outside 
this “trinity,” and a number have looked askance at any sort of “novel” deviation from it.”) (citing In 
re Young Broad, Inc., supra). 
77 See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 419 B.R. 179, 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he experts’ 
Trading Comparables Analyses resulted in similar valuation ranges, which suggests that this 
methodology is the most reliable.”). 
78 In re YL W. 87th Holdings, LLC, 423 B.R. 421, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also In re 
Savannah Gardens-Oaktree, 146 B.R. 306, 311 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992) (calling the expert’s approach 
“defective” for failing to pick an appropriate comparable). 
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expert’s] work was carried out with litigation bias and for the express purpose 
of showing that [debtor corporation] was insolvent.”79 But not all courts catch 
common but invalid valuation strategies, such as “proving” that an estimate 
of future cash flows, prepared in the past, was reasonable by comparing these 
estimates to the realized cash flows. This is type of hindsight bias.80 
D. Courts Are Adept at Applying Multiples Based on CC or TM. 
Valuation based on multiples, such as CC and TM, is simpler because it 
relies less on finance theory and more on arguments about the comparability 
between companies. It is not only simpler than DCF, but it is also easier for 
a judge to evaluate the inputs to the final valuation. Courts can fairly readily 
determine whether an expert is biased because he or she is being paid (or 
receiving a job) if his client wins81 or rejecting a method that he or she 
previously advocated in other, similar cases.82 Courts have also identified 
sources of bias in identifying comparable firms, such as using foreclosure sales 
as proxies for market value,83 or selecting transactions that occurred prior to 
 
79  In re Iridium Operating LLC, 373 B.R. at 283. 
80 Blixseth v. Kirschner (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LCC) provides a possible example of 
such hindsight bias: 
In the offering memorandum, Credit Suisse projected cash EBITDA for the Debtors 
of $83,500,000 in 2005, $97.6 million in 2006, $135 million in 2007 and $269 million in 
2008. Reducing the above numbers for interest expense, Mordy testified that Credit 
Suisse’s true cash EBITDA projections were $60 million in 2005, $72 to $73 million in 
2006 and $113 million in 2007, yet Debtors’ actual cash EBITDA in such years was 
woefully short of Credit Suisse’s projections. The Debtors missed the Credit Suisse 
projections by $42,660,000 in 2005 because Debtors in fact had only $17 million with 
which to repay debt in that year. In 2006, Debtors missed the mark by $46 million 
because cash EBITDA was only $25 million. Similarly, in 2007, Debtors missed the 
mark by $90 million because cash EBITDA was $23 million rather than $113 million. 
Mordy characterized Credit Suisse’s projections as a ‘leap of faith.’ . . . . To test the 
reliability of the projections, [another expert] Reilly chose to compare projected gross 
revenues to actual gross revenues, as opposed to projected cash flows to actual cash 
flows as was done by Mordy and attempted to be done by Sheridan. 
436 B.R. 598, 622, 647-48 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010). 
81 See, e.g., In re Granite Broad. Corp., 369 B.R. 120, 142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (calling an 
expert’s submission “seriously undermined by the fact that his compensation . . . is contingent on 
the total consideration to be received”). 
82 See, e.g., In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that, “in 
[an expert’s] valuations of several other chapter 11 debtors” similar to this one, the expert “used the 
final year’s cash flows in its computation of Terminal Value, and did not use the normalization 
technique it used here. One may legitimately wonder, then, why the normalization technique was 
appropriate here but was not appropriate there—or vice versa.”). 
83 See In re Savannah Gardens-Oaktree, 146 B.R. at 311 (“[The expert] admitted, under cross-
examination, that a foreclosure sale did not meet the criterion of a sale for ‘market value.’”). 
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an industry-wide recession that preceded the bankruptcy filing.84 Courts also 
do a good job identifying cases where the expert generated the multiple using 
an accounting variable that was selected strategically to favor a client’s 
position,85 cases where experts make ad-hoc adjustments based on personal, 
subjective judgment when objective methods are available,86 and cases where 
multiples are applied incorrectly by applying a trailing multiple to forward-
looking data.87 
E. Judges Are Also Increasingly Looking to Market  
Measures Instead of Expert Valuations. 
By market measures, we mean evidence from transactions conducted in a 
market setting. This would include the price offered at an auction, including 
an auction conducted in bankruptcy (which would be relevant to firm 
valuation for purposes of plan confirmation). Market measures could also 
include pre-bankruptcy valuations done by independent experts in a non-
litigation context, such as in connection with a business transaction (which 
would be relevant to the insolvency inquiry in Clawback cases). And market 
measures would also include evidence regarding the terms of financing 
offered to a debtor prior to its bankruptcy (again relevant to the insolvency 
inquiry). At least by 2010, courts were looking to these measures as supportive 
or determinative evidence in valuation disputes.88 
It wasn’t always this way. In 2003, for example, the Delaware bankruptcy 
court rejected expert testimony that aimed “to bring value calculations in line 
with current market value.”89 This was inappropriate, the court said, because 
 
84 See In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 536, 542 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) (finding an expert’s 
“conclusion unrealistic” because world events rendered the “transaction unreliable as a comparable”). 
85 See In re Med Diversified, 334 B.R. at 101 (noting that “the variable [an expert] chose to use, 
net cash flow from operations, actually had an inverse relationship with the financial well-being of 
the company.”). 
86 See In re Hotel Assocs., LLC, 340 B.R. 554, 562 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (finding an expert’s 
“method of making an adjustment” to be “more subjective” and “not as persuasive” as that of a 
separate expert that relied on a “more objective adjustment”). 
87 See In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 457 B.R. 327, 353 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (finding an 
expert’s concluding value off by “approximately $86 million” because she “selected an EBITDA range 
that was based on trailing twelve month EBITDA and then applied that to the Debtors’ year one 
EBITDA.”). 
88 Courts found the measures determinative in cases like Boston Generating, Campbell, and 
Iridium. They were relied on to further support a court’s conclusions in, for example, In re Chemtura 
Corp., 439 B.R. at 586-87 (“[T]he lack of buyers or investors for the Debtors at higher values or 
values within the Equity Committee’s range—a species of ‘market’ information that informs, though 
it does not solely support, my conclusion that the Debtors have met their burden as to value here.”). 
89 In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
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“the ‘taint’ of bankruptcy will cause the market to undervalue the securities 
and future earning capacity of the Debtor.”90 
V. IMPLICATIONS: RULES OF THUMB FOR JUDGES 
Based on our qualitative readings of the valuation opinions in our sample 
and in light of the finance theory and evidence provided above, we provide 
some practical advice for bankruptcy judges. 
A. Reject Arbitrary Add-ons to the Discount Rate. Use the Peer-reviewed Finance 
Literature for Credible Approaches on Discount Rates. 
Finance theory is clear that investors will evaluate the risk of an asset, and 
the return they require for holding it, based on the asset’s contribution to 
their overall portfolio risk, not on a standalone basis. This is the fundamental 
insight underlying the CAPM theory. When investors can diversify cheaply 
and easily, they do not require compensation through higher returns for 
bearing idiosyncratic (or diversifiable) risks. Other empirically based 
methods for determining discount rates, such as the Fama-French method, 
are based on the same principles, although they measure nondiversifiable risk 
using multiple factors instead of only a market factor. 
Valuation industry methods that allow for “company-specific” premia are 
particularly suspect. Moreover, we believe that these methods fail the Daubert 
standard of reliability:91 they are not accepted by the scientific community, 
no empirical evidence supports making the adjustments, and the ad hoc 
nature of the adjustments render them fundamentally untestable.92 
The discount rate is also not the proper place to correct biased cash flow 
projections. A discount rate is an opportunity cost: it is a rate of return that 
an investor expects on her money given the riskiness of the investment. 
Although it is conceivable that a higher denominator (discount rate) could 
 
90 Id. For a discussion of the longstanding antipathy for market measures in corporate 
reorganization, see Blum, supra note 2. 
91 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587-95 (1993) (laying out 
the standard for expert witnesses). 
92 This is not to say that idiosyncratic negative shocks (like the possibility of losing a key 
contract or the entry of a new competitor) are irrelevant to a firm’s value. They can and should be 
reflected in a DCF in the cash flow projections. Future cash flow projections should be expected 
values that incorporate both negative and positive future scenarios, weighted by their probabilities. 
To be sure, estimating the impact and probability of future negative events is difficult, but judges 
deal with these disputes competently when the opposing sides are forced to be transparent about 
their assumptions about these probabilities and to defend them with evidence. For an example, see 
In re 203 N. LaSalle Street P’ship, 190 B.R. at 575 (evaluating the reversionary value of a building 
where “the primary basis for the difference in estimated cash flows” concerned the probability that 
one of the two major tenants renews its lease). 
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act as a “fudge factor” to counteract a biased numerator (cash flow projection), 
there is simply no way a judge can evaluate the appropriate magnitude of this 
adjustment. If the cash flow projections are suspect, it is better to get them 
right than to tinker with the discount rate. Indeed, when courts allow experts 
to tinker with the discount rate, they are rendering the DCF process even 
more opaque and subjective. The discount rate becomes the site of multiple, 
contestable, untestable assumptions. 
We recommend that courts consistently apply the CAPM. We recognize 
the flaws in this method (e.g., there is no universally accepted theory of risk 
premia), but all methods are subject to criticism and the CAPM method is 
the most widely used and recommended method in finance theory and 
practice.93 If courts were to demand that experts use the CAPM, disputes 
would move away from the discount rate and toward cash flow projections, 
which is where the disputes should (we think) be focused. Our understanding 
is that experts and courts tend to defer to projections prepared by the debtor’s 
managers, who are often in the best position to project the firm’s future. 
Instead of challenging those projections, the parties fight to make arbitrary 
adjustments to the discount rate. We think this is a mistake and that valuation 
disputes should center on the source of the controversy—the cash flow 
projections. An environment where the CAPM is used as the standard 
approach would be better than the status quo, which allows maximum 
flexibility to the expert to justify any value she wants by adjusting the 
discount rate. 
B. Weighting Schemes Are Sources of Manipulation,  
Both Across Methods and Within Methods. 
It is common for parties (and courts) to calculate values using multiple 
methods and then combine these methods into an overall “average” value 
using a weighting scheme that places more weight on some values than others. 
In theory, it may be justifiable to place greater weight on one method if it 
conveys more information about the true value than other methods. In 
practice, however, the use of weights can be self-serving. Experts may 
advocate greater weights for the methods that most favor their clients’ 
positions.94 When using DCF, an advocate for a higher discount rate (and a 
correspondingly lower asset value) will often recommend a higher weight on 
the equity in the capital structure, since equity rates of return are higher than 
 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 41–43. 
94 See, e.g., In re Med Diversified, Inc., 346 B.R. at 633 (“It has not escaped the Court’s attention 
. . . that the values derived from applying the other two methods were higher than that from the 
DCF method. By reducing the weights of the results from the other methods, once again [the expert] 
shoved the data to a lower value.”). 
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debt rates of return. Similarly, multiples-based methods require identifying 
a comparison group, and experts often choose weighting schemes to give 
more weight to some comparable companies than others.95 Clever 
justifications for these weighting schemes can always be given after the fact. 
In our view, if a method is sufficiently suitable to be used in the first place, it 
should receive the same weight as other methods. Any other approach is 
vulnerable to abuse. Put differently, equal weighting should be a strong 
default rule—an approach that some courts have already adopted.96 
C. Markets Beat Experts. 
Often the debtor corporation will propose to sell itself or particular assets 
through an auction. The auction, however, may yield prices substantially 
below experts’ estimates of firm value. Should this worry courts? No. Markets 
beat experts. As Judge Easterbrook put it, “Astute investors survive in 
competition; those who do not understand the value of assets are pushed 
aside. There is no similar process of natural selection among expert witnesses 
and bankruptcy judges.”97 As blunt as this proposition is, courts increasingly 
rely upon it.98 
Market evidence may be particularly useful in fraudulent transfer cases, 
where the range of expert disagreement tends to be highest. In this setting, a 
court may be able to rule out the possibility that the firm was insolvent by 
asking whether well-informed market actors—especially unsecured creditors 
and equity holders—treated the firm as if it were solvent at the time of the 
potentially voidable transfer. If a debtor can access credit markets on terms 
comparable to those offered by solvent borrowers and there has been no fraud 
on the market, the debtor is highly unlikely to be insolvent. This is 
particularly true if the debtor can raise capital from unsecured creditors, 
which are highly exposed to the risk of insolvency. A secured lender might 
offer credit to a failing firm, perhaps even on terms that do not differ 
markedly from terms offered to solvent borrowers, if the loan is 
overcollateralized. The terms of unsecured credit, however, will be more 
sensitive to the debtor’s financial condition. Equity markets will be similarly 
 
95 See, e.g., Silverman Consulting, Inc. v. Hitachi Power Tools, U.S.A., Ltd. (In re Payless 
Cashways, Inc.), 290 B.R. 689, 701 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003) (noting that two experts “performed 
similar calculation[s] using different comparable companies” and “[n]ot surprisingly” arrived at two 
very different equity values). 
96 See, e.g., In re Med Diversified, Inc., 346 B.R. at 632 (“[The expert] offers no adequate 
explanation why this Court should not require equal weights to the results obtained by each of the 
three standardized methods.”). 
97 In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987). 
98 See, e.g., In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 327 n.22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(quoting Judge Easterbrook axiom); In re Granite Broad. Corp., 369 B.R. at 140-41 (same). 
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sensitive. If investors are well informed, an insolvent or undercapitalized firm 
will be unable to raise meaningful equity financing.99 
Even if a debtor does not access capital markets after the allegedly 
fraudulent transfer, data from those markets may rebut allegations of 
insolvency or inadequate capitalization. For example, if a debtor’s bonds trade 
at par after the transfer (and if there is no evidence of fraud on the market), 
it is unlikely that the market perceives insolvency or inadequate 
capitalization.100 
What we are proposing here is a sufficient condition for finding solvency 
and adequate capitalization. Elements of this approach can be seen in the case 
law (and recent commentary).101 Courts have frequently held that a firm’s 
access to capital markets on ordinary terms is consistent with solvency or 
adequate capitalization.102 In VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., for example, the 
debtor brought a fraudulent transfer action against the seller from whom it 
purchased its assets (the debtor was created via a spinoff from the seller).103 
The bankruptcy court identified many facts that were inconsistent with the 
debtor’s insolvency at or after the asset sale. One of them was the debtor’s 
continued access to capital markets; in particular, the debtor renegotiated a 
credit facility.104 The lending banks were well informed (after due diligence), 
agreed to an amended agreement, and assigned a BB credit rating to the debt. 
The court noted that this rating “was still equal to or greater than that of 60% 
of the consumer packaged goods companies in the United States.”105 
Subsequently, the debtor sold $200 million in unsecured bonds, which were 
also assigned a BB rating by investors who had been given “full disclosure of 
all facts and circumstances of the Spin-off, the debtor’s performance 
thereafter, the status of the bank financing to which the bonds were 
subordinated, and the numerous risk factors attendant to the bondholders’ 
 
99 For an example of a court employing such an approach, see In re Iridium Operating LLC, 373 
B.R. at 349 (“The fact that Iridium closed on three syndicated bank loans and raised over $2 billion 
in the capital markets between 1996 and 1999 is an indication of both solvency and capital 
adequacy.”). 
100 See id. at 332-33 (“From 1995 through January 1999, Iridium’s bonds generally traded at a 
price at or near par value and this indicated that the bond market believed that Iridium would be 
able to repay the debt owing on the bonds.”). 
101 See Schwartz & Bryan, supra note 23, at 951-52  (arguing courts should consider expert 
testimony on valuation issues only when contemporaneous market evidence, such as actions of 
creditors or counterparties, is unavailable or insufficient). 
102 See In re Iridium, 373 B.R. at 349 (“Courts examining the question of adequate capital also 
place great weight on the ability of the debtor to obtain financing.”). 
103 2005 WL 2234606, at *13 (D. Del. 2005 Sept. 13, 2005). 
104 Id. at *11. 
105 Id. at *13 n.40. 
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unsecured position.”106 Assuming the terms of the bonds were comparable to 
the terms offered to solvent firms in the same industry, these facts establish a 
sufficient condition for the debtor’s solvency at and after the asset sale. 
Cases like VFB do not stand for the proposition that the mere ability to 
access capital markets is sufficient to prove solvency. Capital markets are open 
even to a firm that is defaulting on covenants and looking for financing to 
cover losses.107 The critical question is whether the debtor obtained junior 
capital on terms comparable to those offered by solvent borrowers. 
Of course, the sufficient conditions proposed in this Article—for finding 
reasonably equivalent value when the debtor made transfers for the benefit of 
a corporate group, and for finding solvency and adequate capitalization—have 
limited reach. These conditions won’t be satisfied in many cases. But 
valuation disputes can be more predictable, faster, and cheaper if courts begin 
by asking whether these conditions are satisfied, and turn to the contestable 
methods of valuation only if they are not.108 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 143 
valuation disputes in Chapter 11 from 1990 to the present. Our quantitative 
analysis demonstrates that disagreement about valuation is large and 
pervasive, particularly with respect to Clawback cases such as fraudulent 
transfers. Competing experts disagree about the key inputs in DCF and 
multiples-based valuations, though we find that disagreement about the key 
 
106 Id. at *15; see also id. at *31 (“All of the professionals involved in the Spin-off, as well as 
independent third parties that purchased VFI’s stock and, later, its bonds, believed that VFI’s assets 
were adequate to operate the businesses in which it was engaged.”). 
Another illustration is provided by Credit Managers Ass’n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 
(C.D. Cal. 1985). The court found that the firm had adequate capitalization because its principal 
lender “was willing to lend substantial sums . . . both before and after” the allegedly fraudulent 
transfer. Id. at 187. To be sure, the lender was extending secured credit, and the terms of the lending 
could have indicated that the debtor was inadequately capitalized. The court indirectly addressed 
this issue, noting that the interest rate was one to three percentage points above prime. Id. at 178 
n.4. It appears that the court did not think the terms of financing were indicative of distress. 
107 See, e.g., Tronox Inc. v. Kerr McGee Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 503 B.R. 239, 298 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“At the outset, Defendants’ reliance on Tronox’s ability to issue $450 million in debt 
does not deserve any weight in the solvency analysis. The debt that Tronox issued was secured by 
all of the assets of all of the Tronox companies, and the sophisticated lenders who bought this debt 
well knew they would come first in any bankruptcy or liquidation of the enterprise.”). 
108 Schwartz and Bryan make a similar proposal. See supra note 23, at 939. They argue that a 
court can frequently value an enterprise using market evidence, which they define broadly to include 
not just market prices but also the contemporaneous actions and views of informed insiders and 
market actors (e.g., lenders, creditors, analysts). They propose that courts apply Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702(a) to require “a party wishing to call a valuation expert to make a motion by the close 
of fact discovery affirmatively showing that the trier of fact cannot reach a reasoned decision about 
value by relying on market evidence in the fact record.” Id. at 952. 
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inputs in DCF valuations occurs somewhat more frequently than 
disagreement about the key inputs in multiples-based valuations, especially 
in Clawback cases. 
Our qualitative analysis reveals important departures from finance theory 
and evidence, particularly with respect to the discount rates used in the DCF 
method. In our view, DCF appears to be a less reliable method overall than 
multiples, especially because judges are adept in spotting manipulation in 
multiples-based valuations. We provide rules of thumb to assist judges in 
ruling out problematic assumptions, such as company-specific risk premia, 
that appear in many cases in our sample. We also advocate the use of market-
based evidence over expert valuation and multiples-based approaches over 
DCF whenever possible. 
Our proposals represent incremental steps toward a Chapter 11 process 
with less expert-induced valuation uncertainty. More aggressive steps could 
be taken. For example, bankruptcy judges could appoint mediators to resolve 
conflict among experts. Alternatively, judges could require conflicting experts 
to meet and draft a joint report setting out points of agreement and 
disagreement. Experts might even testify together at trial and ask each other 
questions. A similar procedure (so-called “hot tubbing”) is applied in 
Australia and other jurisdictions.109 Alternatively, judges could announce that 
they will apply a “final-offer arbitration” approach to valuation disputes. 
Under this approach, judges would select the valuation report that is most 
persuasive and adopt it in its entirety. Judges would not average valuations 
across experts; nor would they adopt a valuation that combines pieces of each 
expert’s report. The virtue of this “final-offer arbitration” approach is that it 
might induce experts to be less extreme or biased in their reports.110 The more 
extreme or biased a report is, the less likely the judge will choose the report 
and the more likely the judge will select the other expert’s report. Exploring 
the costs and benefits of these alternatives is left for future work. 
 
109 See generally; Francis P. Kao, Justin L. Heather, Ryan A. Horning, and Martin V. Sinclair, 
Jr., Into the Hot Tub . . . A Practical Guide to Alternative Expert Witness Procedures in International 
Arbitration, 44 INT’L LAW. 1035 (2010); Elizabeth Reifert, Note, Getting into the Hot Tub: How the 
United States Could Benefit from Australia’s Concept of “Hot Tubbing: Expert Witnesses, 89 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 103 (2011). 
110 Casey and Simon-Kerr also discuss the potential variance-reducing benefits of final-offer 
arbitration. See Anthony J. Casey & Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1210 (2015). 
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FIGURE 2       
 Note: This figure plots the percentage difference between the high and low 
valuation, using the high valuation as the reference point. Thus, if the high and low 
values equal each other, the difference in this figure is equal to zero. If the low value 
is more than 100% smaller than the high value, the difference is equal to 1.0 or greater 






























































Note: The terms in this table are defined as follows. 
WACC dispute: Dispute over the calculation of the weighted average cost of 
capital (the discount factor). 
Projection Dispute: Dispute over projected future cash flows. 
Terminal Value Dispute: Dispute over the residual value at the end of the cash 
flow projection. 
Comparables Dispute: Dispute over what companies or assets are comparable. 
Multiplier Dispute: Dispute over which accounting variable should be used in 
the denominator of the multiple. 
Market Value of Comparables Dispute: Dispute over the true value of the 
comparable companies or assets, as well as what adjustments are necessary to account 




















Note: We see in our data that 32 experts generated multiple valuations (based on 
different methods) and proposed a final valuation based on a weighted average of the 
valuations. Twenty-four of the thirty-two experts (75%) used unequal weights. We 
know the weights are unequal because the court’s opinion says so. The court opinion, 
however, does not always report the valuation that received the largest weight. That 
is reported for only twelve of the 24 experts. Among these twelve, seven put largest 
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